In the early 1960s, Israel faced a growing threat from its neighbors. The MiG-21, the Soviet Union’s most advanced fighter jet, which was introduced in 1960, was the backbone of Arab air forces, particularly in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. Israeli pilots had never encountered this aircraft in combat, and intelligence on its capabilities was scarce. If war broke out, Israel needed an advantage—something that would turn the tide in the skies.

The mastermind behind the operation was Meir Amit, the head of Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency. Amit was known for his audacious strategies, and he understood that acquiring a MiG-21 would give Israel a vital edge. The plan was endorsed by Prime Minister Levi Eshkol and Major General Mordechai “Mottie” Hod, the commander of the Israeli Air Force. style="padding-left: 10px;"

But how do you steal a top-secret fighter jet? The answer lay in Munir Redfa, an Iraqi Air Force pilot. Munir Redfa, born in 1934 in Baghdad, felt alienated due to his Christian heritage and had grown disgusted with orders to bomb Kurdish villages. Mossad operatives approached him with an offer: defect to Israel, bring the MiG-21, and secure a new life for himself and his family and of course with a million dollars.

After months of secret meetings, Redfa agreed. His family was smuggled out of Iraq before his flight to ensure their safety. Then, on August 16, 1966, Redfa took off on a routine training mission—but instead of returning to his base, he veered toward Israel.

As Redfa flew toward Israeli airspace, Jordanian radar picked up the rogue aircraft. Alarmed, Jordanian authorities issued alerts to nearby air traffic control stations, and two Jordanian Hawker Hunter jets were scrambled to intercept him. But Redfa was flying at over 9000 meters and at high speed, making it nearly impossible for them to catch him. To make matters more confusing, Iraq failed to respond to Jordan’s inquiries, and Syria falsely claimed responsibility for the aircraft, reassuring Jordan that it was part of a training mission. This miscommunication allowed Redfa to cross Jordanian airspace unchallenged.

As Redfa entered Israeli airspace, he was met by two Dassault Mirage III jets from the Israeli Air Force, which escorted him safely to Hatzor Air Base. Upon landing, Redfa was immediately taken into protective custody, and the MiG-21 was secured for examination.

For Mossad, this was a triumph. Israeli engineers and pilots wasted no time studying the aircraft, uncovering its weaknesses and strengths. The MiG-21 proved to be a goldmine of intelligence. Israeli specialists dissected its technology, learning its flight dynamics, weapon systems, and vulnerabilities. When war erupted in 1967, Israel’s newfound knowledge played a crucial role in achieving air superiority. Israeli pilots used their insights to outmaneuver and destroy dozens of enemy MiG-21s, ensuring dominance over the skies during the Six-Day War. But the significance of Operation Diamond extended beyond Israel. The United States, eager to understand Soviet aviation technology, was granted access to study the aircraft. The insights gained helped U.S. defense planners develop tactics against Soviet-built jets in future conflicts, marking a strategic victory in the Cold War.

After his defection, Redfa lived in Israel for a time before eventually settling in another Western country. He passed away in 1998 due to a heart attack. His MiG-21 remains on display at the Israeli Air Force Museum in Hatzerim, a testament to one of Mossad’s most daring operations.

In late 2024, in the last days of the Assad regime, Syria issued a powerful postage stamp that resonates far beyond its borders. This stamp carries a strong political message of solidarity with Gaza during the ongoing Israel-Gaza war. Prominently featured is the emblem of the Arab League, along with the words "With Gaza" in both Arabic and English. The design is deeply evocative: on the left, a close-up of a keffiyeh-clad figure gazes out with determination, while the right side depicts destruction with the Palestinian flag rising defiantly amidst the rubble.

This stamp is part of a broader initiative by Arab League countries. According to the Kuwait Times (January 13, 2024), the Arab League agreed during its 44th Session of the Arab Permanent Postal Committee to issue a joint postage stamp in honor of Gaza. The aim: to show unified Arab support for the Palestinian people. As stated by Abdullah Al-Humaida, Acting Assistant Undersecretary for Kuwait’s Ministry of Communications for the postal sector, Gaza "had been subjected to a vicious war by the Zionist occupation forces since October 7, 2023, resulting in more than 23,000 deaths and around 60,000 injuries."

The political and historical weight behind this stamp cannot be ignored. While Gaza initiated the war after their barbaric invasion on October 7th, 2023, the likes of which the world has never known and hopefully will never know — this stamp firmly positions Syria and several other Arab states in solidarity with Gaza.

So far, stamps under this initiative have been issued by Syria, Qatar, Oman, Djibouti, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Jordan. Curiously absent, however, are stamps from the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt—despite Egypt presiding over the meeting where the decision was made. And intriguingly, no stamp from Kuwait itself has surfaced, even though it was Kuwait’s delegation that publicly championed the initiative. I should add that these stamps are not cheap, and many were also issued in souvenir sheets giving a feel that they are intended for the collector, but I have seen the stamps on mail!

From a philatelic perspective, the Syrian stamp's production quality leaves much to be desired. The printing is coarse, with muted colors and visible pixelation that dulls the impact of the original design. This is typical of recent Syrian issues, where resource constraints and sanctions have led to lower-quality outputs compared to the sharper, more vibrant prints seen in Gulf states like Qatar or Oman.

This postage stamp is more than a collector’s item; it is a symbol of the political fault lines and alliances that continue to shape the Middle East today.

In the early 1960s, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser began exploring nuclear options. Egypt had a research reactor supplied by the Soviet Union in 1961, and rumors abounded that Nasser was interested in acquiring nuclear weapons to counter Israel, especially after Egypt’s defeat in the 1956 Suez Crisis.

In 1963, Israel became increasingly concerned about Egypt's rocket program, which was supported by German scientists and aimed at developing advanced missile technology. There were claims that Egypt was attempting to equip missiles with radioactive waste and potentially nuclear warheads. During this time, U.S. President John F. Kennedy also pressured Israeli leaders to allow inspections of the Dimona nuclear reactor, fearing that Israel might be developing nuclear weapons.

However, Egypt's progress stalled. The Six-Day War of 1967, in which Egypt suffered a crushing defeat, diverted military and financial resources. After Nasser’s death in 1970 and Sadat’s peace with Israel, Egyptian nuclear ambitions shifted to peaceful energy development.

But Egypt wasn’t the only nuclear concern on Israel’s radar. As one threat faded, another began to rise — this time from the east. In the 1970s, Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, pursued nuclear technology under the pretense of civilian energy. Iraq purchased a French-made Osirak reactor with the help of France and some Italian cooperation. The reactor, officially for peaceful purposes, was not suitable for energy generation, but it was very well-suited for plutonium production—a red flag for nuclear weapons development.

So Begin and his team cook up a plan. A crazy plan. Fly thousands of kilometers into enemy territory, undetected, bomb the reactor before it goes live, and fly back home — all without starting World War III.

The pilots? Hand-picked, young, and fearless. Among them: a future astronaut named Ilan Ramon (maybe a future blog post). They trained for months, memorizing maps, practicing flying just above the desert sand to avoid radar.

And then, on June 7, 1981, they launched. Eight F-16s with F-15 escorts. Silent. Low. Fast. Like shadows across the sand.

They reached the reactor. A few seconds of dive bombing. Boom. The Osirak reactor is reduced to rubble. One direct hit after another. No one even had time to blink.

The year was 1968, and Israel was facing an urgent crisis. The victory in the Six-Day War had come at a cost, as you remember from the previous newsletter, France, once a key arms supplier, had turned its back on Israel. President Charles de Gaulle, condemning Israel’s preemptive strike, imposed a strict arms embargo, cutting off access to the powerful Dassault Mirage 5 fighters that Israel had already paid for.

Israel needed a solution.

Somewhere in Switzerland, in the quiet offices of Sulzer, a company licensed to produce components for the Mirage III’s SNECMA Atar 9C engine, an unassuming Swiss engineer named Alfred Frauenknecht went about his work. He was not a spy, nor a man with strong political beliefs—just an engineer in need of money. And money, as it turned out, was something Israel was willing to provide. An operation was put in motion to acquire the Mirage blueprints by any means necessary.

Israeli intelligence, known for its daring operations, identified Frauenknecht’s financial troubles and made an offer: a large sum of money in exchange for technical documents. Frauenknecht hesitated, but the lure of wealth proved too strong. Slowly, methodically, he began to collect thousands of classified blueprints—detailed schematics of the Mirage’s airframe, avionics, and most importantly, the Atar 9C engine.

For the next few years (1968-1969), Frauenknecht smuggled out documents in secret, passing them into the hands of Israeli intelligence. The blueprints, once in Israeli possession, were studied by engineers at Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). With these stolen plans, Israel reverse-engineered the Mirage 5, producing an almost identical aircraft—the IAI Nesher.

But Israel didn’t stop there. Armed with this knowledge, their engineers went further, replacing the Atar 9C engine with the more powerful General Electric J79, the same engine used in the American F-4 Phantom II. This modification required significant engineering changes, including structural reinforcements to handle the increased thrust and upgraded avionics to integrate both Israeli and American weaponry

And then came one of the biggest aerodynamic improvements, the addition of canards, small forward wings placed near the cockpit. These were introduced in the Kfir C2 and later models, drastically improving:

• Maneuverability – The aircraft could turn tighter, making it deadlier in dogfights.
• Takeoff and landing performance – Shorter takeoff distances and better control at low speeds.
• Stability – Compensating for the heavier engine and increasing overall control.

The result? A new aircraft—the IAI Kfir—a fighter even deadlier than the Mirage it was based on.

Meanwhile, Frauenknecht’s activities did not go unnoticed. By 1971, Swiss authorities uncovered the breach. Frauenknecht was arrested, charged with espionage, and sentenced to four and a half years in prison. The case caused an international scandal, but by then, the damage was done. Israel had what it needed.

By 1975, the first IAI Kfirs rolled off the production line and entered service with the Israeli Air Force. Later, the fighter was exported to Colombia, Ecuador, Sri Lanka, and even the United States (as the F-21, for training).

The Mirage had been born in France. But its Israeli descendant, the Kfir, was something entirely different—the product of necessity, espionage, and engineering ingenuity, proving once again that Israel could not be outmatched, even by an arms embargo.

The Cherbourg boats incident was a significant event that occurred in December 1969, involving Israel's acquisition of naval vessels under unusual circumstances.

Relationship between France and Israel had been relatively good, with France being a major supplier of Israeli military equipment. We all know about the relationship which led to the 1956 Sinai Campaign as well as our first atomic reactor. In the mid-1960s, Israel ordered 12 missile boats from France. These were Sa'ar-class vessels, to be built at the Cherbourg shipyards in France.

However, after the 1967 Six-Day War, French policy toward Israel changed dramatically under President Charles de Gaulle. In December 1968, France imposed an arms embargo on Israel. Despite the embargo, five of the boats had already been delivered, but the remaining seven were stuck in Cherbourg, paid for but not released. The embargo was a severe blow to Israel, as the missile boats were a crucial part of its naval defense strategy.

Admiral Mordechai "Mokka" Limon was the head of Israel’s arms procurement delegation in France at the time. He understood that we needed these ships and devised an elaborate plan to obtain these vessels. He had played a crucial role in negotiating the original missile boat deal and together with Shimon Peres, Director-General of the Defense Ministry at the time, they planned an elaborate plan to get the boats to Israel. Peres secured the necessary government approval and funding for the covert operation.

So what was the plan, you ask? Well, Limon created a fictitious Norwegian oil company called "Starboat," which supposedly purchased the boats for oil exploration in the North Sea, helping circumvent French authorities. This ruse allowed Israeli personnel to continue working on the boats in Cherbourg without raising suspicion.

He personally recruited a team of Israeli naval officers and sailors who quietly traveled to Cherbourg and prepared for the operation. Actually they were almost caught by immigration into France but a friendly Moroccan-born Jew let them through.

Limon meticulously planned the logistics of the escape, choosing Christmas Eve when French surveillance would be minimal and officials would be on holiday. He coordinated with Israeli intelligence to ensure the success of the operation, planning everything from false documentation to refueling arrangements.

On Christmas Eve 1969, the sea conditions in Cherbourg port were quite dramatic. A Force 9 gale was blowing, which is a strong gale with wind speeds between 41-47 knots (47-54 mph or 75-88 km/h). This kind of weather would have created very rough sea conditions, with high waves and challenging navigation. It was on this night, when most port workers and French authorities were celebrating the holiday, that the Israeli crews, disguised as civilians, boarded the boats. Without clearance from the French authorities, showing almost no lights, the missile boats quietly slipped out of Cherbourg harbor into the teeth of the Force 9 gale which kept even large freighters from venturing out.

They sailed through the stormy Atlantic Ocean, avoiding detection. The boats traveled a secretly pre-planned route, refueling at sea from Israeli commercial ships. By the time French authorities realized what had happened, the vessels were already in international waters. This operation became known as "Operation Noa," named after the daughter of Admiral Mordechai Limon who orchestrated the plan.

After a long journey of more than 3,000 nautical miles, they reached the Israeli port of Haifa on New Year's Eve, December 31, 1969.

The escape was an embarrassment for France, as it demonstrated Israel's ability to outmaneuver a major Western power. Though French authorities were angered, they did not take serious action beyond diplomatic protests.

The incident caused diplomatic tension between France and Israel but ultimately led to no serious consequences. The boats later became an important part of the Israeli Navy fleet and were used in various operations. The Israeli Navy was able to revise our strategy in favor of smaller missile boats, rather than the larger, slower destroyers. The French-built Saar class boats which were "liberated" from Cherbourg were the first fast attack vessels to meet the new needs.

The missile boats later played a key role in developing Israel’s missile boat fleet, which would prove crucial during the Yom Kippur War (1973), particularly in naval battles against Egypt and Syria.

During the South Africa apartheid era, Israel and South Africa maintained discreet military cooperation, and South Africa became interested in the Sa'ar / Reshef-class vessels due to their impressive performance. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, South Africa acquired modified versions of these missile boats, known as the "Minister" class or sometimes "Reshef" class in South Africa. South Africa ultimately operated nine vessels based on the Israeli Sa'ar design, built with Israeli assistance. I was told that these were named the Minister class, with vessels bearing names like SAS Minister of Defense, SAS Minister of Transport, etc. Not sure if that is true.
The operation was a brilliant combination of naval expertise, strategic deception, and intelligence work. I am hoping for more stories like these.

All of us know what Hamas did on that fateful day on October 7, 2023, which was far worse than the American 11th September, but for those who have forgotten:

Hamas launched a land, sea, and air assault on Israel from the Gaza Strip, which resulted in more than 1,200 deaths, primarily Israeli citizens, marking it as the deadliest day for Israel since its independence. More than 240 people were kidnapped by Hamas during this invasion. This was the worst massacre of Jews since the Holocaust, a true act of genocide/

Israel declared itself in a state of war for the first time since the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and conducted air strikes on the Gaza Strip, followed by the incursion of ground troops and armored vehicles. The intent was to destroy the Hamas tunnels and to rescue the hostages.

Hamas' military wing and other Palestinian armed groups committed numerous war crimes and crimes against humanity against civilians during the assault. I will spare the details here of Hamas' rapes and heinous acts because this is a blog about stamps. I will state something that many people have ignored, Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005 and Gaza was a 100% Palestinian entity.

The support for Hamas through the philatelic community was very quick, stamps being introduced already in 2023, barely two months after the invasion.

Jordan

On the 7th November 2023, Jordan Post was quick to enter the philatelic support announcing that they were going to overprint some issues with the phrase (Gaza the Steadfast). They claimed:

* The first issue, consisting of one stamp, which bore the name of the Intifada and was issued in 1991 with a value of 20 fils, was a new issue for this year, decorated with a new value of one Jordanian dinar, bearing the phrase (Gaza the Steadfast), where the decoration came in blue. Strangely this was issued in only 1000 copies and prices reach in the hundreds. The intent here is probably for philatelist.

* The second issue, consisting of one stamp, which bore a drawing of the Arch of Triumph (Hadrian’s Arch) in the ancient city of Jerash, issued in 2003, with a value of 50 fils, was a new issue for this year, decorated with a new value of one Jordanian dinar, bearing the phrase (Gaza the Steadfast), with the decoration in black.

Libya

Libya soon followed with an overprint of its own with words "Gaza Struggle"

Syria

Syria issued a stamp with the words "Occupation Resistance". This must not be confused with the stamp that they issued in October for the 50th Anniversary of the October War. It seems strange that they would issue another stamp so quickly, less than two months after the invasion. Stamps take preparation.

Iraq

Iraq also jumped on the bandwagon and issued a stamp and a souvenir sheet, showing the Dome of the Rock but with the words Tawafan Al-Aksa, a common error. No, I don't accept the current woke whitewash that the Arabs refer to the entire Temple Mount as Al Aksa seeing as how they use a different term, Haram al Sharif. However the word Tawafan means a storm, meaning a storm on the Temple Mount (using the proper terminology)

Today we are going to show a case of religious reasons for withdrawing an issue.

November 19, 1987, South Africa Postal Authorities intended to issue a four-stamp set to commemorate the Bible Society of South Africa, which was founded in 1820.

However, one of the stamps, the 40c stamp contained two lines of script, one in Koine Greek, the language of the New Testament, and one in Hebrew, the language of the Old Testament. Both of the lines contained the word “God”.

The Orthodox Jewish community protested that the stamps were a serious transgression of Judaic law, which says that God’s name may appear only in the Torah and prayer books. It was not permissable for God's name to be torn, cancelled or defaced in any way, especially during mail handling process.

o offense had been intended by the Postal Authorities and they quickly recalled the 40c stamps from the Post Offices across South Africa, before the initial release date.

The stamps were prepared to be destroyed in the interests of religious harmony. However, they were informed this was equally unacceptable to the Jewish community and were told that the stamps should be buried.

The Postal Authorities decided that was a step too far and the stamps were duly destroyed.

It is understood that some of the smaller Post Offices were running short of 40c stamps and opened their parcels before the official release date. They were sold over the counter with many being used for postage. It is believed that less than 1300 stamps exist.